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I. INTRODUCTION
Enter Adnan Farhan Abdul Latif,** a detainee currently held at
Guantanamo Bay and ordered released by the United States District Court,
District of Columbia (District Court).1 The Government charges “that Latif
was a member of al Qaeda or Taliban forces.”2 Conversely, Latif maintains
he was traveling for medical reasons and was never part of the Taliban.3
The Government bases its opinion on a “heavily redacted” report titled
[REDACTED] Report [REDACTED] (Report).4 The Report and the
accuracy of the facts therein are at the heart of Latif’s case.5 The District
**

As this article went to press, Adnan Latif was found dead in his cell at Guantanamo
Bay; his cause of death has not yet been identified. See Baher Azmy, The Face of
Indefinite Detention, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 14, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/14/
opinion/life-and-death-at-guantanamo-bay.html. This development would not have
changed the author's analysis, as intelligence reports will still qualify for a presumption
of regularity in future cases involving Guantanamo Bay detainees.
1. See Abdah v. Obama, No. 04-1254, 2010 WL 3270761, at *10 (D.D.C. Aug.
16, 2010) (basing its order on conflicting testimony and the court’s determination that
the intelligence report was not sufficiently reliable to afford a presumption of
regularity), vacated and remanded sub nom. Latif v. Obama, 677 F.3d 1175 (D.C. Cir.
2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2741 (2012).
2. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at *2-3, Latif v. Obama, No. 11-1027, 2012
WL 549261 (Jan. 12, 2012) (seeking certiorari from the Supreme Court of the United
States to reverse the D.C. Circuit Court and release Latif pursuant to the District
Court’s order).
3. See Latif, 677 F.3d at 1177 (characterizing this story as an “innocent
explanation”).
4. See id. (stating that this report details Latif’s travels as the basis for the
government’s case).
5. See generally id. (finding, however, that the Report was sufficiently reliable to
sustain Latif’s detention when afforded a presumption of regularity).
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Court held that it was unable to “credit that information because there is a
serious question as to whether [Redacted] accurately reflects [Redacted] the
incriminating facts [Redacted] are not corroborated, and Latif presented a
plausible alternative story . . . .”6 Nevertheless, the United States Court of
Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) reversed the habeas
order and found that the lower court should have afforded the Report a
“presumption of regularity, requiring the court to presume that the
information in the Report had been accurately recorded.”7
This Recent Development argues that the D.C. Circuit manifestly denied
Latif a meaningful review of his detention due to its application of a
presumption of regularity to intelligence reports and its insistence on
conducting new fact finding.8 Part II examines pre-conviction habeas
corpus claims for detainees held under the Authorization for Use of
Military Force,9 the different legal standards of a presumption of regularity
and a presumption of authenticity,10 and concludes with the facts and
opinions issued by the D.C. Circuit in Latif v. Obama.11 Part III argues that
the D.C. Circuit erred by refusing to defer to the District Court’s fact
finding and insisting that the Report qualified for a presumption of
regularity.12 Part IV concludes that the Supreme Court should have granted
certiorari in this case to resolve the cloud of outstanding legal issues in
detainee cases.13

6. See Abdah, 2010 WL 3270761, at *9 (ordering Latif’s release based on the
Report’s unreliability).
7. See Latif, 677 F.3d at 1185 (noting that no other courts had expressly granted
this level of presumption to intelligence reports in detainee cases).
8. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 779 (2008) (stating that detainees had
the right to a meaningful review of their detainment); infra Part III (noting the disdain
the D.C. Circuit has for the Court’s decision in Boumediene).
9. See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224
(2001) (granting broad powers to the President to fight future terrorism against the
United States); infra Part II.A (explaining how the process for detainee habeas review
began and subsequently developed).
10. See infra Part II.B (explaining that a presumption of regularity affords
intelligence documents a presumption that, for instance, the interpreter correctly
interpreted what the detainee said, while a presumption of authenticity would only
afford the intelligence report a presumption that it was actually the correct report).
11. See generally Latif, 677 F.3d at 1175 (explaining the reasoning for continuing
to detain Latif); infra Part II.C (explaining that the D.C. Circuit overruled the lower
court on several issues, including the application of a presumption of authenticity to
intelligence reports).
12. See infra Part III (arguing that the D.C. Circuit misapplied the law both with
respect to the presumption afforded intelligence reports and the standard by which it
reviewed the lower court’s decision).
13. See infra Part IV (stating that the D.C. Circuit requires further guidance in
order to effectuate a meaningful review of habeas status for detainees).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Life of a Pre-conviction Detainee Habeas Corpus Claim
One week after the devastating attack on the World Trade Center on
September 11, 2001, Congress passed the Authorization for Use of Military
Force (AUMF), which authorizes the President to use whatever force
deemed necessary to prevent future attacks against the United States from
the people who “planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist
attacks.”14 Since Congress passed the AUMF, litigants have bombarded
the courts with challenges to the Government’s power to detain individuals
pursuant to the AUMF.15 The Supreme Court has settled two of these
issues, but the D.C. Circuit has never allowed a detainee to be released
from Guantanamo Bay.16
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court declared that the Government
could lawfully detain enemy combatants pursuant to the AUMF.17
Following that ruling, the Government established Combatant Status
Review Tribunals, which evaluated whether individuals held at
Guantanamo Bay qualified as enemy combatants.18 Several of these
combatants filed suit challenging their detention in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia, and the Supreme Court
eventually ruled that statutory habeas corpus claims applied to Guantanamo
Bay in Rasul v. Bush.19 Congress then passed the Detainee Treatment Act
(DTA), stripping jurisdiction from the courts in Guantanamo cases alleging
habeas corpus claims.20 Following the passage of the DTA, the Supreme
14. See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224
(2001) (authorizing the President to also use force against those who harbored these
individuals or organizations); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004) (stating
that the AUMF authorized the detention of enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay).
15. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 779 (2008) (granting detainees
the right to challenge their detention in habeas proceedings); Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510
(establishing that the government may detain enemy combatants pursuant to the
AUMF, but that certain judicial procedures must also be in place); Latif, 677 F.3d at
1199 (stating that Latif’s detention was lawful despite questions about the validity of
the report the government used to justify his detention).
16. See, e.g., Lyle Denniston, D.C. Circuit: Last Stop for Detainees?,
SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 9, 2012, 3:48 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=140439
(questioning whether the Supreme Court would grant certiorari in eight new detainee
cases to stop the D.C. Circuit Court from overturning every release order the District
Court has ordered to date).
17. See 542 U.S. at 518 (stating that the power to detain these individuals was
necessary and appropriate force as an incident to war).
18. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 733 (noting that the term “enemy combatants”
was defined by the Department of Defense for the purpose of these tribunals).
19. See 542 U.S. 466, 473 (2004) (stating that 28 U.S.C. § 2241 had extended the
jurisdiction to Guantanamo Bay, but declining to decide whether there was also a
constitutional right to habeas corpus in Guantanamo Bay).
20. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 735 (explaining that the statute also gave the D.C.
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Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld held that the DTA could not remove the
Court’s jurisdiction in cases that were pending when Congress passed the
DTA.21 In response to this move by the Court, Congress passed the
Military Commissions Act (MCA), once again attempting to remove the
detainee cases from the jurisdiction of Article III courts.22
The most important case addressing detainee rights in this area is
Boumediene v. Bush.23 The Court in Boumediene found that the detainees
in Guantanamo Bay have a constitutional right to habeas corpus review,
and that the detainees do not have to exhaust all other remedies before
seeking this relief.24 Additionally, the Court required that this habeas
review must be “meaningful” in order to pass constitutional muster.25
Boumediene explicitly found that meaningful habeas review must include
the ability to order the release of any individual that the court deems has
been detained unlawfully.26 Boumediene also stated that, because these
detainees were being held pursuant to an executive order rather than
through a formal trial in a court, the reviewing court did not have to give
the same level of deference.27 Rather, the reviewing court must consider
both “the cause for detention and the Executive’s power to detain.”28
B. Presumption of Regularity
In many cases, courts will grant a presumption of regularity to official
acts by public officials.29 This presumption allows the court to assume that
Circuit exclusive jurisdiction to review tribunal claims (citing 119 Stat. 2742)).
21. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 578 (2006) (finding that the statute
was not sufficiently specific to remove the Court’s jurisdiction in cases already
pending).
22. See 10 U.S.C.A. § 948d (Supp. 2007) (attempting, once again, to prevent
Article III courts from hearing Guantanamo Detainee cases, including habeas corpus
petitions).
23. See generally 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (addressing, for the first time, the detainee’s
constitutional rights to habeas review in Article III courts, outside of statutory grants of
habeas review).
24. See id. at 733-36 (providing a detailed history of the writ of habeas corpus in
order to inform the decision).
25. See id. at 778 (qualifying this requirement by saying that “meaningful” review
does not mean that the review must be as rigorous as normal court proceedings).
26. See id. at 779 (referring to the common law habeas corpus claim, as opposed to
various habeas claims that were established by statute).
27. See id. at 783 (contrasting the circumstances of a detainee in Guantanamo Bay
with a criminal who was tried and convicted in a court of law).
28. See id. (stating that the habeas proceedings do not need to resemble a criminal
trial, but that habeas must still be an effective means to ensure the detainee retains his
or her rights).
29. See Sussman v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 494 F.3d 1106, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(noting this presumption is to apply unless there is clear evidence why it should not
(citing United States v. Chem. Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926))).
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the public official conducted their affairs properly and accurately.30 This
presumption applies to both government-produced documents and official
acts,31 and it is not meant to afford the document an assumption of
accuracy—that is, the court may find that the facts contained therein are
inaccurate even if the presumption of regularity applies.32 Courts generally
confer the presumption of regularity to documents such as official tax
receipts, court documents, mail delivery methods, and agency actions.33
The presumption also relies on common sense: the court can readily trust
these types of documents because they are made or maintained in
sufficiently reliable and familiar practices.34 In detainee cases, however,
courts traditionally apply a presumption of authenticity to intelligence
reports.35 A presumption of authenticity affords the document less credit
than a presumption of regularity, finding only that the document was what
it claimed to be, but disregarding the factual content therein.36 Recently, in
Latif v. Obama, the D.C. Circuit Court ruled that the Government’s
intelligence reports should be afforded a presumption of regularity, rather
than a presumption of authenticity.37
C. Latif v. Obama
At the District Court, the Government relied primarily on the Report, a
heavily redacted intelligence report that was prepared as the result of an

30. See id. (noting that once the defendant has shown clear evidence why this
presumption should not be afforded, the burden shifts to the government to prove the
document deserves the presumption).
31. See Latif v. Obama, 677 F.3d 1175, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (allowing a
presumption of regularity to apply to a foreign tax receipt (citing Riggs Nat’l Corp. v.
Comm’r, 295 F.3d 16, 21 (D.C. Cir. 2002))), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2741 (2012).
32. See id. at 1180 (noting that the lower courts seemed to be confused on this
point).
33. See id. at 1207 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (stating that these are familiar, accessible
actions and documents that do not require much scrutiny (citing Riggs Nat’l Corp., 295
F.3d at 21; Hobbs v. Blackburn, 752 F.2d 1079, 1081 (5th Cir. 1985); Legille v. Dann,
544 F.2d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402, 415 (1971))).
34. See id. (noting that these documents are produced in the ordinary course of
business).
35. See id. at 1213 (stating these cases refused to afford the presumption of
regularity in favor of a presumption of authenticity, over the government’s objection
(citing Ahmed v. Obama, 613 F. Supp. 2d 51, 54-55 (D.D.C. 2009); Al Mutairi v.
United States, 644 F. Supp. 2d 78 (D.D.C July 29, 2009))).
36. See id. (stating that the District Court has been applying this standard without
direction from the Circuit Court (citing Ahmed, 613 F. Supp. 2d at 54-55; Al Mutairi,
644 F. Supp. 2d at 78)).
37. See id. at 1187 (majority opinion) (finding that the uncertainty around which
the Report was made did not mean that it should not be afforded a presumption of
regularity based on, among other reasons, comity with the other branches of
government).
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interview with Latif.38 The facts in the Report are largely disputed on
either side.39 According to the Report, Latif was recruited by the Taliban
and traveled to Afghanistan “via Sana’a, Yemen; Karachi, Pakistan; and
Quetta, Pakistan,” meeting Ibrahim Al-Alawi in Kandahar, Afghanistan.40
Al-Alawi then took Latif to the Taliban, who trained him to use weapons
and “stationed him on the front line against the Northern Alliance.”41 Latif
then fled back to Pakistan with other “fleeing Arabs” and was subsequently
captured near the Afghan border of Pakistan in 2001, before being
transferred to Guantanamo Bay in 2002.42 The District Court applied a
presumption of authenticity to the Report, but declined to afford it a
presumption of regularity43 because of the significant questions about the
reliability of the Report.44
Latif insisted that he only traveled to Afghanistan to seek medical
treatment.45 He also stated that the Government’s version of events was
based on a Report that contained statements that were so inaccurate, they
must have been misattributed to him, or his statements must have been
misunderstood.46 Latif maintained that he had never been part of the
Taliban.47 As Latif presented “a plausible alternative story,” the District
Court found that the Government had not proved that his detention was
lawful by a preponderance of the evidence, and subsequently ordered the
Government to release him from Guantanamo.48
The Government appealed the District Court’s ruling to the Circuit
Court, arguing that the District Court erroneously applied a presumption of

38. See Abdah v. Obama, No. 04-1254, 2010 WL 3270761, at *6 (D.D.C. Aug. 16,
2010) (noting that the Report is not corroborated by other evidence), vacated and
remanded sub nom. Latif v. Obama, 677 F.3d 1175 (D.C. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132
S. Ct. 2741 (2012).
39. See Latif v. Obama, 677 F.3d 1175, 1178 (noting that if both sides agreed on
the facts in the intelligence report, Latif’s detention would be indisputably lawful).
40. See id. at 1177, 1194-95 (noting later that this route was a strange way to get
from Pakistan to Afghanistan).
41. See id. at 1177 (stating that Latif “saw a lot of people killed during the
bombings, but never fired a shot [sic]”).
42. See id. (noting that the government relied upon a heavily redacted report for its
version of Latif’s movements to and from Afghanistan).
43. See Abdah, 2010 WL 3270761, at *9 (stating that the Report was not
sufficiently reliable to warrant a presumption of regularity).
44. See id. at *8 (noting that, considering the contents, the court could not take the
Report lightly).
45. See Latif, 677 F.3d at 1177 (characterizing this story as a “quest” for medical
treatment for head injuries he sustained in a 1994 car accident).
46. See id. (excluding some redacted information).
47. See id. (characterizing this as an “innocent explanation”).
48. See id. (finding that other potentially inconsistent comments by Latif were
unconvincing and did not rise to the level of proof required in this case).
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authenticity to the Report.49 The Circuit Court found that subjecting the
Report to a presumption of authenticity also subjected it “to the hesaid/she-said balancing of ordinary evidence.”50 Conversely, Latif argued
that the conditions under which the Report was made were not sufficiently
reliable to afford it a presumption of regularity.51 The court, however,
disagreed and found that the Report contained too many incriminating facts
to be the result of simple translation error.52 The court next considered
whether the “clerical errors” contained in the Report were sufficient to
rebut the presumption of regularity in this case.53 While the court
acknowledged that the Report did contain some errors, it found that “the
internal flaws Latif identifies in the Report and the other evidence he uses
to attack its reliability fail to meet this burden.”54 The lengthy dissenting
opinion found that the majority should have applied the clear error standard
when reviewing the District Court’s fact findings, and that the presumption
of authenticity was correctly applied to the intelligence report.55
III. ANALYSIS
A. The D.C. Circuit Court Should Not Have Applied a Presumption of
Regularity to the Government’s Intelligence Reports Because These
Reports Are Not Like Tax Records.
The D.C. Circuit Court erred when it applied a presumption of regularity
to the Report in Latif because intelligence reports are not prepared under
sufficiently reliable conditions.56 The presumption of regularity has
traditionally been applied to documents, such as tax records, that are
“produced within a process that is generally reliable because it is, for

49. See id. at 1178 (declining to review the District Court’s fact finding for clear
error based on this claim).
50. See id. at 1179 (characterizing the District Court’s presumption of authenticity
as a rule that Latif proposed, as opposed to the general practice that the District Court
had employed until then).
51. But see id. at 1186 (finding that the Report was sufficiently reliable despite
“clerical errors”).
52. See id. at 1188 (refraining from assuming that the Report was made in bad faith
absent a showing of such facts).
53. See id. at 1187 (stating that the clerical errors were inconsequential in this case,
when the Report was considered as a whole).
54. See id. at 1186-89 (involving a detailed analysis of the facts alleged in the
case).
55. See id. at 1215 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of “moving the
goal posts” by putting the burden of proof on the defense to show that the Report is not
reliable enough for the presumption of regularity).
56. See id. at 1208 (noting that the Report “was produced in the fog of war by a
clandestine method that we know almost nothing about”).
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example, transparent, accessible, and often familiar.”57 The Supreme Court
itself has applied this presumption to tax records, even when produced by
foreign governments, “because we have no reason to question or be
concerned with the reliability of such records.”58 As such, documents that
qualify for this type of presumption are not usually questioned regarding
their accuracy.59
In Latif’s case, the Report’s reliability is at the heart of the matter.60 The
Report was produced largely in secret for national security purposes.61 As
such, these procedures cannot be “familiar, transparent, generally
understood as reliable, or accessible . . . .”62 Further, this Report is not a
mundane record, but one that was made by a translator and a transcriber,
prepared in stressful conditions, and subsequently redacted to ensure no
information that could be harmful to national security would be released.63
The only instance the majority cites for its contention that it may apply a
presumption of regularity to “processes that are anything but ‘transparent,’
‘accessible,’ and ‘familiar’” is a case where the Supreme Court applied the
presumption of regularity to foreign tax records.64 As the Supreme Court
itself cited the reliability of such documents as the rationale for deciding to
apply the presumption of regularity to foreign tax documents, the Circuit
Court should have also considered the Report’s reliability before affording
it a presumption of regularity.65

57. See id. at 1207 (finding that “every case applying the presumption of
regularity” has adhered to this description).
58. See id. at 1208 (noting this was the only case that the majority cited to support
their reasoning for applying a presumption of regularity to the Report (citing Riggs
Nat’l Corp. v. Comm’r, 295 F.3d 16, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing Supreme Court
cases))).
59. See id. at 1207 (absent evidence of error, courts do not need to question these
types of documents because of their transparency, accessibility, and familiarity).
60. See id. at 1179 (majority opinion), 1208 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (questioning the
reliability of the Report by stating that it was “prepared in stressful and chaotic
conditions, filtered through interpreters, subject to transcription errors, and heavily
redacted for national security purposes”).
61. See id. at 1208 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (implying this alone could be enough to
question its reliability for the purposes of applying a presumption of regularity).
62. See id. (contrasting the Report with more traditional documents, such as tax
records, with which the court can be sufficiently familiar such that the government does
not have to prove their reliability).
63. See id. (“Needless to say, this is quite different from assuming the mail is
delivered or that a court employee has accurately jotted down minutes from a
meeting.”).
64. See id. (claiming that the court had no reason to question whether these records
were reliable (citing Riggs Nat’l Corp. v. Comm’r, 295 F.3d 16 (D.C. Cir. 2002))).
65. See id. (noting that the Report is not familiar, transparent, reliable, or
accessible).
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1. The Intelligence Reports Are Not Sufficiently Reliable to Qualify for a
Presumption of Regularity.
Because the Government has not shown that the procedures for creating
these intelligence reports are sufficiently regular, familiar, or transparent,
the Circuit Court should have applied a presumption of authenticity, not
regularity.66 A presumption of authenticity does not require the same level
of reliability that a presumption of regularity does.67 In the context of
intelligence reports, a presumption of regularity includes a presumption
that the information in the report is recorded accurately, whether or not the
information itself is factually true.68 In cases like Latif, this creates a
burden on the detainee to produce more evidence to rebut a document that
does not have the traditional indicia of reliability that other presumptively
regular documents have.69 The District Court has repeatedly applied a
presumption of authenticity, rather than regularity, because of this lack of
reliability associated with intelligence reports.70
The process of preparing intelligence reports such as the Report is not
sufficiently regular to qualify for a presumption of regularity.71 These
reports are based on multiple levels of hearsay, which makes them
inherently unreliable.72 They are based on interrogations which may
involve a detainee, an interrogator, a translator, and a transcriber;
sometimes several translators, interrogators, or transcribers are involved.73
The detainee may make a statement in response to an interrogator’s
question that is then relayed through a translator.74 The statement is then
66. See id. at 1209-10 (stating that he would have allowed these decisions to be
made on a case by case basis, rather than applying a blanket rule).
67. See id. at 1213 (noting that the Government requested an even more stringent
presumption of accuracy (citing Ahmed v. Obama, 613 F. Supp. 2d 51, 54-55 (D.D.C.
2009); Al Mutairi v. United States, 644 F. Supp. 2d 78 (D.D.C. 2009))).
68. See id. at 1213 (stating the majority has not cited any cases where the District
Court expresses confusion about the difference between a presumption of truth or
accuracy).
69. See id. at 1215 (stating that this shift has “called the game in the government’s
favor” by not only requiring Latif to rebut the presumption of regularity, but also
finding that the facts on the record did not rebut the presumption).
70. See generally id. at 1212 (stating that this standard gives the Report some
weight, but less than what the Government and the circuit court prefer (citing Alsabri v.
Obama, 764 F. Supp. 2d 60 (D.D.C. 2011); Hatim v. Obama, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1
(D.D.C. 2009); Ahmed, 613 F. Supp. 2d 51)).
71. See generally id. at 1209; Al Mutairi, 644 F. Supp. 2d at 84 (considering issues
regarding translation and transcription accuracy).
72. See Al Mutairi, 644 F. Supp. 2d at 84 (stating that multiple levels of hearsay
was one reason not to afford the government’s evidence a presumption of accuracy or
authenticity).
73. See Latif, 677 F.3d at 1214 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (noting this process can cause
errors in the transcript or report (citing Odah v. Obama, No. 06-cv-1668, slip op. at 3
(D.D.C. May 6, 2010))).
74. See id. (noting that these inaccuracies can be “impossible to detect” (quoting
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relayed back through the translator to the transcriber and the interrogator.75
This process can be incredibly stressful and prolonged.76 In one case, “the
Government believed for over three years that [a detainee] manned an antiaircraft weapon in Afghanistan based on a typographical error in an
interrogation report.”77
This type of error is not uncommon; in Latif’s case, numerous reports
about him contained discrepancies.78 Additionally, a language expert
examined the transcript of Latif’s hearing in front of the Combatant Status
Review Tribunal and concluded after reviewing a tape of the proceedings
that it contains statements attributed to Latif that he never uttered.79 When
a translator “in the context of a quasi-judicial [proceeding]” can make such
significant errors, a translator acting in a highly stressful interrogation
environment cannot be considered regular enough to qualify for a
presumption of regularity.80
These procedures are also not familiar or transparent enough to apply the
presumption of regularity because the secrecy surrounding the
circumstances of these reports makes it impossible for the court to
adequately analyze the Report’s reliability.81 In the context of intelligence
reports, these two factors go hand in hand: information about how the
information in the reports is obtained and how the reports themselves are
made is often highly redacted to protect national security.82 This process is
Odah, No. 06-cv-1668, slip op. at 3)).
75. See id. (recognizing yet another opportunity for an error in the Report to occur
(citing Odah, No. 06-cv-1668, slip op. at 3)).
76. See id. at 1214 (quoting Odah, No. 06-cv-1668, slip op. at 3, that “the
interpreter must understand the question posed and correctly translate it; the
interviewee must understand the interpreter’s recitation of the question; the interpreter
must understand the interviewee’s response and correctly interpret it; the interrogator
must understand the interpreter’s translation of the response; the interrogator must take
accurate notes of what is said; and the interrogator must accurately summarize those
notes when writing the interrogation summary at a later time”).
77. Al Mutairi, 644 F. Supp. 2d at 84 (explaining that the person who was actually
suspected of manning the aircraft had a similar identification number as Al Mutairi and
that number was incorrectly cited as Al Mutairi’s).
78. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 2, at *17 (stating that one report
listed Latif as Yemeni, while another stated he was Bangladeshi but a member of a
Yemeni tribe, and one report stated that he eventually graduated high school while
another reported that he never graduated).
79. See id. at *18 (noting the expert reviewed the transcript in English).
80. See id. (stating these types of reports are not at all similar to documents like tax
receipts, which usually are afforded a presumption of reliability).
81. See generally Latif, 677 F.3d at 1216 (Tatel, J., dissenting); Petition for a Writ
of Certiorari, supra note 2, at *19 (arguing this is “significantly at odds” with the
Court’s ruling in Boumediene).
82. See Latif, 677 F.3d at 1216 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (“The Report’s heavy
redactions—portions of only [redactions] out of [redactions] pages are unredacted—
make evaluating its reliability more difficult.”).
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“highly secretive,” which makes it unfamiliar,83 so the court has no
meaningful way to decide whether the process of making these reports is
generally reliable.84 Without a meaningful way of evaluating how these
reports are created, the reports cannot be familiar or transparent enough to
warrant a presumption of regularity in their favor.85
2. The Circuit Court Should Have Afforded Intelligence Reports a
Presumption of Authenticity.
While the Report is not sufficiently reliable to qualify for a presumption
of regularity, the Report is reliable enough for a presumption of
authenticity because neither side has challenged that the Report is the
intelligence report prepared in Latif’s case.86 The District Court has
regularly applied a presumption of authenticity for intelligence reports
because they are sworn declarations by government officials.87 A
presumption of authenticity allows the court to accept a particular
document into evidence without the same rigorous requirements that other
documents might need, such as calling a witness to the stand to verify what
the document is.88 This assists the fact finder in a way that a presumption
of regularity does not; a presumption of regularity effectively requires the
fact finder to accept the report, and the facts therein, as true.89 On the other
hand, a presumption of authenticity allows the fact finder to avoid delay in
the process by accepting the document as authentic, but still make findings
as to the document’s reliability and accuracy.90 In this case, the District
Court correctly afforded the Report a presumption of authenticity, and the
83. See id. at 1209 (stating this point is less expansive than the majority seems to
think).
84. See id. (allowing the District Court to make reliability judgments on a case by
case basis is more consistent than creating a presumption in either party’s favor).
85. See id. (stating that whether the Report is accurate has an effect on whether the
information contained within the Report is accurate).
86. See id.; Alsabri v. Obama, 764 F. Supp. 2d 60, 66-67 (D.D.C. 2011); Ahmed v.
Obama, 613 F. Supp. 2d 51, 54-55 (D.D.C. 2010); Hatim v. Obama, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1,
10 (D.D.C. 2009) (finding that a presumption of authenticity was appropriate to give
the fact finder latitude to give an intelligence report weight depending on factual
determinations).
87. See Latif, 677 F.3d at 1210 (Tatel, J., dissenting); Alsabri, 764 F. Supp. 2d at
66-67; Ahmed, 613 F. Supp. 2d at 54-55; Hatim, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 10 (stating that the
sworn declaration does give the reports more reliability than other, unsworn
documents).
88. See Ahmed, 613 F. Supp. 2d at 55 (stating that the “exigencies of the
circumstances” will allow hearsay testimony into the record (citing Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004))).
89. See id. (stating that there is no reason to presume the facts contained in a report
are accurate, especially when many of those facts are contested).
90. See id. (stating that the Government does not even necessarily have to offer
foundation for each exhibit’s admissibility).
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Circuit Court should not have demanded a presumption of regularity for
intelligence reports because a sworn statement authenticating the document
is only sufficient for a presumption of authenticity.91
B. The Circuit Court’s Insistence on Labeling the District Court’s Failure
to Apply a Presumption of Regularity as a Legal Error Is a Pretext for
Conducting New Fact Findings to Avoid Applying the Clear Error Test.
The Circuit Court had no cause to conduct fact finding at the appellate
level; the District Court did not commit clear error when it credited more
weight to Latif’s version of the events than to the events contained in the
Report because it considered all the facts in this case and made a
reasonable decision to credit Latif’s version of events over the
Government’s.92 Because the trial court has the opportunity to view live
testimony and witnesses, appellate courts must give deference to the fact
findings of the trial court and review these findings for clear error.93 As
appellate courts review findings of law de novo, the court is not required to
give any deference to the lower court’s ruling.94 Because of the District
Court’s reasonable decision to believe Latif in light of all the evidence, the
Circuit Court in Latif should have reviewed the District Court’s findings for
clear error and upheld Latif’s release.95 Instead, the Circuit Court instituted
a new standard of presumption in order to avoid applying the clear error
test in favor of the more flexible de novo standard.96 By reviewing the
District Court’s decision de novo, the Circuit Court also made improper
findings of fact in its reasoning when it reviewed the facts to determine if
Latif rebutted the presumption of regularity.97

91. See Latif, 677 F.3d at 1210 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (finding it completely
inadequate for the majority to rely “on the bare fact that government officials have
incentives to maintain careful intelligence reports” as authority to grant a presumption
of regularity).
92. See id. at 1215 (stating that the clearly erroneous standard is generally applied
in detainee cases at the appellate level).
93. See Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 6-7 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (stating that the standard
is not different for live testimony or documentary evidence).
94. See Almerfedi v. Obama, 654 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“The court’s specific
factual determinations are reviewed for clear error, whereas its ultimate
determination—whether a detainee’s conduct justifies detention—is a question of law
reviewed de novo.”).
95. See Latif, 677 F.3d at 1209 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (finding the Report unreliable,
reliance on Latif’s account reasonable, and all the evidence adequately addressed).
96. See id. at 1185-87 (majority opinion) (characterizing their analysis as whether
Latif adequately rebuffed the Report).
97. See id. at 1189 (finding, for instance, that everything Latif said corroborated
portions of the Report, bolstering the Report’s credibility).
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1. Applying the Clear Error Test in Latif Would Require the Circuit Court
to Affirm Latif’s Release.
The District Court did not commit any clear error in its fact finding,
thereby requiring the Circuit Court to affirm Latif’s release.98 Fact findings
at the district court level must be given “full deference under the clearly
erroneous standard or they must be vacated.”99 In this case, the Circuit
Court reviewed the presumption of authenticity de novo in order to then
review the reliability of the Report.100 By reviewing the reliability of the
Report, the Circuit Court took the opportunity to make new findings of fact
without first evaluating the District Court’s findings for clear error.101 The
Circuit Court could not have found clear error in order to conduct new fact
findings because the District Court was reasonable when it found that the
Government’s version of the events was not credible enough to hold
Latif.102
2. Believing Latif’s Explanation for His Presence in Afghanistan Was Not
Clearly Erroneous.
The District Court was not clearly erroneous when it believed Latif’s
explanation that he was in Afghanistan for medical reasons more than the
Government’s explanation that he was in Afghanistan to join the Taliban
because this was a reasonable interpretation of the evidence.103 While
weighing the evidence and possible inconsistencies, the District Court
reasonably concluded that Latif’s explanation was plausible.104 This
determination is a declaration of Latif’s credibility—a factual
determination that may be set aside by the reviewing court only if it is
clearly erroneous.105
Latif’s story did not contain meaningful
98. See id. at 1224 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (finding Latif’s story plausible and
supported by the evidence in the record).
99. See United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 117 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc)
(confirming that there is no middle ground between clear error and de novo, even if the
Circuit Court disagrees with the factual findings).
100. See Latif, 677 F.3d at 1185-86 (stating that Latif must show more convincing
evidence, superseding that of the Government, in order to rebut the Report).
101. See id. at 1207 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (stating that “[a]ll agree that this case turns
on whether the district court correctly found that the government’s key piece of
evidence . . . was unreliable” and that this is to be reviewed under a clear error test
(citing Al Alwi v. Obama, 653 F.3d 11, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2011))).
102. See id. at 1216 (citing Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (stating
that when the lower court hears “two permissible views of the evidence, the fact
finder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous”).
103. See id. at 1222 (finding that even if Latif’s explanation was not complete, it
was a reasonable explanation that the District Court did not clearly err in crediting).
104. See id. at 1222-24 (considering each of the majority’s objections to the District
Court’s findings and stating that each fails to rise to clearly erroneous).
105. See Almerfedi v. Obama, 654 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (stating that the court
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inconsistencies that would prevent the District Court from relying on his
explanation; in fact, the inconsistencies the Government alleged were either
Given its inaccuracies and
inconsequential or not inconsistent.106
inconsistencies, the Report was not sufficiently reliable.107 This was a
factual determination of the Report’s credibility and the Circuit Court could
only review it for clear error, which it could not find because this
determination was reasonable.108
The Report contained several
inconsistencies that damaged its credibility in the eyes of the District
Court.109 Unlike the supposed inconsistencies in Latif’s story, the problems
with the Report were more substantial and resulted in discrediting the
Report.110 Each of these conclusions was supported by evidence in the
record.111 As such, the District Court was not clearly erroneous when it
made factual determinations based on evidence in the record because its
conclusions were reasonable, based on all of the facts.112
IV. POLICY
A. The Circuit Court Denied Latif Meaningful Review of His Detention by
Affording a Presumption of Regularity and Issuing New Fact Findings.
Latif never received meaningful review of his detention in Guantanamo
Bay because the Circuit Court erroneously gave the Report a presumption
of regularity and made new fact findings outside of the clear error test.113 If
a detainee seeks review under habeas corpus, the detainee must have
“meaningful review” of their detention in Article III courts to justify that
must judge the persuasiveness of the evidence before deciding whether the detainee
should be released).
106. See Latif, 677 F.3d at 1221 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (arguing that, after arduous
translations, minor inconsistencies in the story were unsurprising); Abdah v. Obama,
No. 04-1254, 2010 WL 3270761, at *9 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 2010) (finding that the
Government had not put forth sufficient evidence, and that Latif had plausibly
explained why he was in Afghanistan), vacated and remanded sub nom. Latif v.
Obama, 677 F.3d 1175 (D.C. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2741 (2012).
107. See Latif, 677 F.3d at 1217 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (noting that the District Court
looked at the effect of the evidence contained in the record cumulatively).
108. See id. (including issues like inconsistencies in the name of the supposed
Taliban contact).
109. See id. at 1207 (stating the majority found these errors to be minor).
110. See Abdah, 2010 WL 3270761, at *10 (finding that the inconsistencies the
Government points out could have been caused by translation errors).
111. See Latif, 677 F.3d at 1216 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (stating that there were factual
errors in the Report); Latif, 2010 WL 3270761, at *10 (finding that medical
professionals corroborated Latif’s story).
112. See Latif, 677 F.3d at 1216 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (finding that the District Court
reviewed all the evidence when issuing its decision).
113. See id. at 1206-07 (majority opinion) (stating this in part because the majority
found that Latif did not rebut the Report’s presumption of regularity).
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detention.114 While the Supreme Court has not since discussed what
“meaningful review” means for detainees, this review must be in a court
that has the power to release the detainees, and the court must consider the
evidence establishing why the detainee is held, and whether the Executive
has the power to hold the detainee.115
In this case, the Circuit Court has failed to meet the standard of
“meaningful” review because the Circuit Court gave the Report a
presumption of regularity and then made factual findings without applying
a clear error test.116 Because the presumption of regularity essentially
mandated that the District Court accept the facts contained in the Report as
accurately recorded, these issues denied Latif meaningful review of his
detention giving the Government’s case more weight than the District
Court felt it deserved.117 Latif was also denied meaningful review in that
the Circuit Court ignored appellate practices and conducted fact finding at
the appellate level without applying a clear error test.118
1. Affording Intelligence Reports a Presumption of Regularity Improperly
Shifts the Burden of Proof from the Government to the Detainee.
The Circuit Court has shifted the burden of proof from the Government
to Latif by finding that the Report should be afforded a presumption of
regularity that the detainee must then rebut.119 While the majority states the
lower courts do not have to accept that the facts contained in the Report are
accurate, the District Court does have to accept that the statements were
accurately recorded.120 That is, the courts in future detainee cases will have
to find that “in doing the interview, [the translator] correctly heard,
translated, recorded, and summarized the content embodied in the
report.”121 However, in cases like Latif’s, where the defense that a detainee
wishes to present in habeas proceedings is different than the information
114. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 779 (2008) (characterizing this right as
“uncontroversial”).
115. See id. at 783 (finding that this is especially important when the person is held
by executive order rather than pursuant to a conviction in court).
116. See Latif, 677 F.3d at 1206-07 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (charging the majority
opinion with making significant fact findings contrary to the District Court).
117. See id. at 1226 (“If we take seriously the notion that district courts are better at
finding facts and determining credibility, then we should be all the more eager to defer
to their expertise when the stakes are high and when the case . . . rests entirely on
credibility and how one interprets the facts.”).
118. See id. at 1207 (“Finding of facts, whether based on oral or other evidence,
must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.” (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6))).
119. See id. at 1206 (characterizing this as moving the goal posts on the defendant).
120. See id. at 1210 (finding that the circumstances under which the Report was
created cast doubt on its reliability).
121. See id. at 1213 (arguing that this is especially pertinent when the central issue
in Latif’s case was precisely whether the Report reflected what he said).
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contained in the intelligence report, the court will consequently have to find
that he is unreliable.122 As the court will have to find that he did in fact say
the statements contained in the intelligence report if that report is afforded
a presumption of regularity, any defense that is contrary to that report will
be considered an inconsistent statement.123 Meaningful review cannot
require a detainee to either rebut a presumption of regularity or call himself
a liar if he wishes to contradict the information contained in these
intelligence reports as part of his defense.124
However, the Circuit Court reduces this possibility by failing to clearly
articulate what standard the detainee would have to overcome.125 The
Court never states the standard by which the presumption of regularity can
be rebutted, whether by clear and convincing evidence, or merely a
preponderance of the evidence.126 Had the District Court erred on the side
of caution and required the detainee to present clear and convincing
evidence to rebut the presumption, the Circuit Court could have reviewed
the District Court’s finding de novo as it did in this case.127 Reviewing this
de novo would allow the Circuit Court to supplant its views over the
findings of the District Court.128
2. The Circuit Court Conducted New Fact Findings to Reiterate the
Government’s Case and Prevent the District Court from Releasing Latif.
The Circuit Court made new fact findings in order to reinforce the
Government’s case to keep Latif detained at Guantanamo Bay.129 Even if
the Circuit Court correctly concluded that the Report warranted a
presumption of regularity, the Circuit Court should have refrained from
reviewing the District Court’s fact findings and simply remanded the case

122. But see id. at 1180 (majority opinion) (arguing that a presumption of regularity
does not require the court to find the facts contained in the Report are true).
123. See id. (stating this presumption assumes that the translator “accurately
identified the source and accurately summarized his statement”).
124. See id. at 1186 (finding that the flaws in the Report were not enough to rebut
the presumption of regularity because the incriminating statements were “separate
statements”).
125. See id. at 1185 n.5 (stating that courts have required differing standards of
proof to rebut a presumption of regularity).
126. See id. (declining to decide what standard of proof is necessary to rebut such a
presumption since Latif could not meet either standard).
127. See id. at 1185 (declining to explicitly refer to the standard of review as de
novo but treating the District Court’s refusal to grant a presumption of regularity as a
legal question rather than a factual one).
128. See id. at 1221 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (highlighting that the majority itself does
not find that Latif’s story is implausible).
129. See id. at 1207 (pointing out several areas where the majority made new fact
findings aligned with the government’s arguments).
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back to the lower court for reconsideration.130 Instead, the Circuit Court
reviewed whether the evidence was sufficient to rebut the presumption of
regularity, found that it was not sufficient, and remanded the case back to
the District Court with a mandate that the District Court review the facts in
this case once more.131 By giving the District Court this reminder, the
Circuit Court is essentially ordering the District Court to follow its fact
findings.132 As the Circuit Court has already reviewed the Report and
found that Latif’s evidence was insufficient to rebut the Report’s
presumption of regularity, the District Court will be unable to make any
other finding than to deny Latif’s habeas corpus claims.133 Both sides agree
that if the facts contained in the Report are accurate, Latif’s detention is
lawful.134 By conducting its own fact finding to show the Report’s
presumption of regularity is not rebuttable under the current record, the
Circuit Court has dictated how the District Court must rule on remand.135
The Circuit Court has essentially buttressed the Government’s case and
made releasing Latif under these facts impossible.136
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court had the opportunity to grant certiorari and consider
the issues raised by this case.137 Instead, the Supreme Court denied
certiorari and allowed the Circuit Court opinion to stand, leaving questions
about improper fact finding and the standards of evidence in detainee cases
uncertain for the future.138 The current state of detainee law is at a
130. See id. at 1215 (charging the majority with “engag[ing] in an essentially de
novo review of the factual record, providing its own interpretations, its own narratives,
even its own arguments”).
131. See id. at 1199 (majority opinion) (characterizing Latif’s account of the events
as “self-serving”).
132. See id. (reminding the District Court that “even details insufficiently probative
by themselves may tip the balance of probability . . . and that in the absence of other
clear evidence a detainee’s self-serving account must be credible—not just plausible”).
133. Compare id. at 1221 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority’s decision
to conclude that the presumption of regularity has not been rebutted leaves little reason
to remand back to the lower court), with id. at 1199 (majority opinion) (finding that the
District Court should have the “opportunity to apply the controlling precedent” when
deciding the merits of this case).
134. See id. at 1178 (majority opinion) (noting that because of this, Latif’s case
depends entirely on the reliability of the Report).
135. See id. at 1206 (Henderson, J., dissenting) (“Latif could only dig himself deeper
into a hole on remand.”).
136. But see id. (stating that the only outcome the record supported was to allow
Latif’s continued detention).
137. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 2, at *12 (stating that the
Supreme Court should resolve what “meaningful review” means in light of
Boumediene).
138. See Latif, 677 F.3d at 1221 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (opining that, even with an
answer to what the standard of evidence in this case is, the presumption “comes
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standstill.139 The Circuit Court refuses to allow the District Court to release
any detainees.140 The Supreme Court should have granted certiorari to
resolve these questions and decide what the standard in Boumediene means
in present detainee cases.141

perilously close to suggesting that whatever the government says must be treated as
true” (quoting Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 849 (D.C. Cir. 2008))).
139. See, e.g., Lyle Denniston, Ex-Judge: Boumediene Is Being “Gutted,”
SCOTUSBLOG (Jul. 17, 2012, 3:54 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/07/exjudge-boumediene-is-being-gutted/#.UAXXb86ZlhQ.twitter (quoting one panelist as
saying the detainees are “‘stuck in Guantanamo’ under a legal regime that gives their
captors every advantage”).
140. See id. (“The Circuit Court ‘has taken the capital ‘M’ off of the word
‘meaningful’ and has taken the ‘full’ off the word, and deprived it of meaning. To me,
that means it’s gutted.”).
141. See id. (stating that the Supreme Court should be monitoring the Circuit Court,
but seems unwilling to do so).
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